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Abstract
Background: In its pursuance of universal health coverage (UHC), the government of Benin is piloting a project of
mandatory social insurance for health entitled “ARCH”.
Methods: We analysed budget data and ARCH documents, and conducted four observation missions in Benin
between March 2018 and January 2020. Results are presented in terms of the three classical objectives of public
expenditure management.
Results: The government of Benin faces important budgeting challenges when it comes to implementing the
ARCH social insurance project: (i) the fiscal space is quite limited, there is a limited potential for new taxes and
these may not benefit the ARCH funding, hence the need to prioritise fiscal resources without jeopardising other
areas; (ii) the purchasing of health services should be more strategic so as to increase allocative efficiency and
equity; (iii) the efficiency of the expenditure process needs to be improved, and more autonomy needs to be
devoted to the operational level, so as to ensure that health facilities are reimbursed in a timely fashion in order to
meet insured people’s health costs, in such a way as to avoid jeopardizing the financial equilibrium of these
facilities.
Conclusion: The important budgeting challenges faced by Benin when it comes to implementing its UHC policy
are also faced by many other African countries. It is important to avoid a situation in which the resources dedicated
by the government to the social health insurance system are at the expense of a reduction in the financing of
preventive and promotional primary healthcare services.
Keywords: Universal health coverage, Health financing, Budgeting, Public expenditure management, Strategic
purchasing, Benin
Introduction
Like many other African countries, Benin is confronted
with important problems with regard to accessibility to
healthcare. According to the recent Global Monitoring
Report on universal health coverage (UHC), the service
coverage index (SDG-UHC indicator 3.8.1) was at 39.6%
in 2017 (down from 40.2% in 2015). Data on the inci-
dence of catastrophic expenditure (SDG-UHC indicator
3.8.2) date back to 2011, when it was 10.9% (respectively
5.4%) and 10% (respectively 25%) of household total
consumption or income [1]. More recent survey and
census data indicate that only 8.4% of the population is
covered by some form of health insurance. While about
40% of the population is poor, more than half of them
(23% of the total population) are extremely poor [2].
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Currently, the health financing system in Benin is ex-
tremely fragmented. Several financial protection schemes
coexist – in particular, contributory schemes covering
civil servants, retirees and employees of the formal
sector; targeted fee exemptions; and voluntary
community-based health insurance [3]. Health insurance
is not compulsory, but this should change in the near fu-
ture. In its pursuance of UHC, the President of Benin
[elected in 2016] and its government launched two
major reforms: on the one hand, an ambitious reform of
the “supply-side” (service provision) of the health sector
and its governance – including the creation of new regu-
lation authorities overseeing the Ministry of Health, and
a reinforcement of public-private partnerships [4]. A
new autonomous agency in charge of planning, coordin-
ating and implementing the national policy with regards
to primary health care has been created in October 2019
[5], and other counselling and regulating bodies in
charge of the hospital and pharmaceutical policies have
also been created in late 2019. On the other hand, on
the “demand-side” (financial protection), the government
has opted for developing mandatory social insurance for
health, coupled with other insurance-type social protec-
tion schemes targeting the poor and the informal sector,
under the project entitled Assurance pour le Renforce-
ment du Capital Humain (ARCH). The two reforms
were priorities of the electoral programme of the Presi-
dent, the Hon. Patrice Talon, who closely monitors its
design work. No such ambitious reform has been previ-
ously initiated in this sector, and the undergoing dy-
namic is remarkable. However, when the government
shared the proposed reform agenda with stakeholders
outside of the two commissions, it faced some resistance
by some constituencies, and a strike action was launched
in the health sector.
The ARCH project is currently piloted by a manage-
ment project unit under supervision of a national steer-
ing committee [6]. The pilot implementation of the
health insurance scheme is partly delegated to an au-
tonomous agency of the Ministry of Health (Agence
nationale de l’assurance-maladie). However, will later be
managed by another agency, the Agence Nationale de
Protection Sociale, created in 2019 under the supervision
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Microfinance, which
will be responsible for the operational management and
general supervision of the ARCH scheme when it is
scaled up [2, 7]. A method for identifying the poorest
households has been validated at the national level, and
relies on a mixed approach combining community iden-
tification and a proxy means test [8]. A list of poor and
extremely poor households has been pre-identified
through community identification. This comprises 467,
621 poor households, of which 224,213 are deemed to
be extremely poor, out of a total of 1,960,615
households. The government intends to finance 100% of
the health insurance premiums for the poorest (esti-
mated 1,895,810 beneficiaries), and 40% of the premiums
for the other (non-extreme) poor (estimated 2,468,254
beneficiaries) [2]. Following two actuarial studies, the
health insurance annual premium’s cost (6000 CFA
francs or about 10 US dollars (USD)) was finally roughly
estimated on the assumption that insured people would
have two medical contacts per year, times the average
consultation cost at primary healthcare level. It is
planned that a private sector insurance company will be
given a mandate to manage the health insurance compo-
nent of the ARCH [2]. Nevertheless, not all elements of
the ARCH projects are set in stone as yet, because the
project has only been piloted in three health districts
starting in August 2019.
An analysis of the health financing indicators in Benin,
some of which are presented in Fig. 1 below, raises sev-
eral concerns. First, the total expenditure on health is
low, below the threshold of 5 % of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) commonly recognised as a minimum for
UHC [9]. Health capital expenditure is particularly low
(0.25% of GDP in 2015) and the health sector receives a
low share of general government expenditure (three to 4
% in recent years). Second, the share of domestic private
health expenditure is still significant (almost 50% of
current health expenditure) and, in particular, out-of-
pocket expenditure comprise more than 40% of current
health expenditure, amounting to USD 38.08 (purchas-
ing power parity) per capita in 2017. Third, the share of
voluntary health insurance is very limited and stagnant
over time (slightly above 5 % of current health expend-
iture). Finally, Benin is very dependent on development
aid, since external health expenditure comprises a sig-
nificant and growing share of current health expenditure
(from 25% in 2007 to 30% in 2016).
The design and implementation of such an important
reform as the ARCH project raises important trade-offs
and challenges. This paper intends to analyse the bud-
geting challenges raised – both at the revenue mobilisa-
tion and at the spending levels – by the launch of the
state-subsidised mandatory social health insurance in
Benin. It limits itself to a consideration of the policy de-
sign and institutional challenges, without considering fu-
ture implementation issues. We believe this can support
reflection on the part of the Beninese authorities, but
also on the part of other countries in Africa, since these
challenges are faced by many governments seeking to
achieve UHC.
Methods
This paper rests mostly on the analysis of budget data
(“Lois de Finances”), legal acts and ARCH documents
collected in Cotonou. However, we also collected
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information on stakeholders’ perceptions about the re-
form through two research projects which have followed
up the development of the UHC policy in Benin since
2015. In this context, the non-Beninese authors con-
ducted four missions in Benin in March 2018, April and
October–November 2019, and January 2020, while the
Beninese authors have followed the policymaking
process continuously. In total, we conducted semi-
formal interview with 29 persons (five of them were
interviewed twice) comprising representatives of the
government, development partners, private insurers and
other resource persons. The informants were chosen in
a reasoned manner on the basis of their technical, ad-
ministrative or political skills and position (directors,
managers, programme officers, technical agents) in the
various institutions involved in policymaking and imple-
mentation of the social protection and health sectors.
This enabled to diversify viewpoints between institutions
and between informants’ positions. The semi-structured
interviews aimed to collect factual data and to investi-
gate informants’ knowledge and perceptions with
regards to the ARCH project, their own intervention in
the field, and their opinions as for the future perspec-
tives of financing, coverage and policy effects. The ques-
tions were fairly open and anchored on the interventions
of each stakeholder. The results from our analysis are
presented in terms of the three classical objectives or
functions of public expenditure management [10].
Results
From aggregate fiscal discipline to fiscal space for health
Aggregate fiscal discipline is a desired public sector
outcome stemming from the appropriate control of
public resources [10]. Whereas the term “discipline”
may be viewed negatively, as a coercive means aimed
at shrinking public (social) expenditure, this principle
has actually been reinvigorated through the accept-
ance of a more positive concept which has gained a
lot of attention in the past decade: that of fiscal space
[11–14]. “In the broadest sense, ‘fiscal space’ can be
defined as the capacity of government to provide add-
itional budgetary resources for a desired purpose
without any prejudice to the sustainability of its fi-
nancial position” [15]. The concept of fiscal space has
been refined over time and encompasses a number of
policy options, the most commonly used being mobil-
izing additional revenues, increasing prioritization of
budget toward health, and improving technical and al-
locative efficiency of health expenditure – or a com-
bination of these [16].
In 2019, Benin had an estimated nominal GDP of
1218 USD per capita, and an estimated GDP annual
growth (at constant prices) of 6.9% [17]. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund considers that Benin’s
macro-budgetary situation is gradually improving:
the authorities are rationalising current expenditure
[notably through a wage bill rationalisation], improv-
ing the efficiency of public investment, and strength-
ening the mobilisation of domestic revenue. The
2019 budget provided for an ambitious effort to mo-
bilise tax revenue. Taxes were expected to increase
by 1.5% of GDP in 2019, so as to create fiscal space
for increased public investment and pro-poor spend-
ing [18]. The fiscal deficit actually narrowed signifi-
cantly in 2019 to 0.5% of GDP, much lower than
anticipated, thanks to an over performance of
Fig. 1 Key health financing indicators, Benin, 2008–2017. Global Health Observatory Data Repository [http://apps.who.int/nha/database/ViewData/
Indicators/en ], consulted 23 December 2019
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domestic tax and non-tax revenues. With a debt ra-
tio of 41.2% of GDP in 2019, the risk of debt dis-
tress remains moderate. Short-term economic
prospects have been revised downward because of
the Covid-19 shock, but the medium-term outlook
continues to be favourable [17].
There is still no clarity as to the funding mechanism of
the ARCH itself. An assessment of innovative financing
for health was performed in 2015. It was estimated that,
among the considered options, taxes on flight boarding
and on alcohol would help raise the greatest amount of
revenues, and that a combination of five new taxes could
enable the government to raise about an additional 54
million USD per year [19] (about 0.36% of GDP). Not all
recommendations from this study were implemented
however, and it is interesting to note the opacity of the
ARCH scheme financing. Apart from the personnel and
functioning expenditure of the unit and agency in charge
of it, the entire funding of the health insurance pilot
project – estimated at 2.86 billion CFA francs (about
4.78 million USD or about 0.03% of GDP) – is entirely
off-budget, and based on external contributions. As for
the long-term funding of the ARCH when scaled up, ac-
cording to several interviewed high ranking decision
makers from the ARCH project, the Ministry of Health
and donors, three innovative taxes were supposed to
have been launched in 2016 to finance the ARCH pro-
ject (on flight boarding, on mobile phone charges, in the
form of excise duties) which were supposed to bring in
about 9 billion CFA francs (15.1 million USD or about
0.10% of GDP) per annum. Another innovative financing
source, entitled a solidarity tax, imposed on voluntary
private health insurance premiums, is also planned to
complete the scheme in the future. Note first that these
taxes are largely insufficient, compared to the expected
costs of the premiums to be subsidised by the state – es-
timated at 20.26 billion CFA francs or 33.90 million
USD (about 0.23% of GDP) under the assumptions ex-
plained above. However, an examination of the budget
law paints another picture: the tax on flight boarding
was launched by the previous government in 2013, and
increased in 2017; a tax on short text messages was in-
stituted in 2016 (also before the current government was
in power) but revoked in 2018. The excise duties have
existed for even longer. Moreover, while the interviewed
persons seem to believe these taxes were earmarked for
financing the ARCH project, actually, the special ac-
count created in 2014 to finance the former govern-
ment’s health insurance scheme (entitled Régime
d’Assurance Maladie Universelle), was indeed funded by
2 % of the tax on mobile phone charges and 1% of the
boarding tax, was suppressed in 2019, and leftover funds
were transferred to the general Treasury account [20,
21]. Thus it appears that the resources necessary to
finance the ARCH project are not only insufficient, but
also far from secured. According to unofficial informa-
tion communicated during our missions in 2019 and
2020, there was still a financing gap of 241 billion CFA
francs (403.2 million USD in total, or about 2.74% of
GDP) for the ARCH project as a whole over the period
2019–2023, of which an estimated gap of 108 billion
CFA francs (180.7 million USD, i.e., on average, 36.1
million USD or about 0.25% of GDP per year) for the
health insurance scheme. The Agency in charge of man-
aging social health insurance has seen its budget reduced
from 548 million CFA francs in 2017 – of which 500
million (about 836,500 USD) in the form of subsidies to
other entities – to 271 million CFA francs in 2019 – of
which only 200 million (about 334,600 USD) in the form
of subsidies [22, 23].
Beyond the cost of the social health insurance, it is
important that the government continues financing
the supply-side elements of the health system. A re-
cent estimation of the additional expenditure needed
to achieve the sustainable development goals shows
that Benin would have to almost double its health ex-
penditure, and find additional spending equal to 5.1%
of GDP in the health sector by 2030, notably to allow
the hiring of 8 times more doctors and 4 times more
support staff [18].
Overall, Benin faces huge budgetary needs to finance
the ARCH social insurance scheme plus the supply-side
of the health sector. The tax code in Benin is quite com-
plex and the fiscal policy is continuously evolving [24].
The government has started to implement a number of
fiscal measures for that purpose, but they may not all be
sufficiently efficient and sustainable, especially since Af-
rican contexts are characterised by non-linear growth
patterns [25]. The above-mentioned specific taxes are
certainly not sufficient to sustain funding for the UHC
scheme – even in the event that they were actually ear-
marked for it. Overall, fiscal space for health studies
show significant power of economic growth, budget rep-
rioritisation and efficiency improvement measures to
drive fiscal space for health expansion, but the limited
evidence available is not conclusive in showing potential
for earmarked funds, be it in the form of public health
taxes or social health insurance contributions, to provide
a large-scale, sustained expansion of fiscal space for
health [14, 26]. So, while the broad fiscal measures
pointed to above are laudable, it appears that the author-
ities seem to have considered mainly the policy option
of mobilizing additional revenues so as to create fiscal
space for the ARCH project, but has overlooked the op-
tions of increasing prioritization of budget toward
health, and improving technical and allocative efficiency
of health expenditure. One may question whether the
government will continue to allocate sufficient resources
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from the general Treasury account to fund the ARCH
project over the long term. Indeed, the financing scheme
must not be subject to annual trade-offs in the frame-
work of the ordinary budgetary process. Moreover,
Benin faces a (moderate) risk of over-indebtedness [18],
thus possibly compromising aggregate fiscal discipline.
From resource allocation to strategic purchasing
A second level of desired public sector outcomes ex-
pected from the public expenditure management system
deals with ensuring that resource allocation and resource
use reflects strategic priorities; it stems from the plan-
ning function relating to the future allocation of re-
sources [10]. At this level again, this principle has been
“modernised” and has attracted a lot of attention in re-
cent years through the promotion of the principle of
“strategic purchasing”. Strategic purchasing basically re-
quires switching from reimbursing services or incremen-
tally revising line-item budgets to choosing ex-ante what
services better respond to population health needs. It is
championed by the World Health Organisation as a key
means for health system strengthening on the path to
UHC, enabling increased efficiency and value for money,
while also improving equity in terms of benefit entitle-
ments and stable healthcare delivery [27–29].
Despite being very fashionable, there is no consensual
definition of strategic purchasing, the evidence base is
limited, and many possible instruments may be used to
render purchasing more strategic [30]. In Benin, the bulk
of the healthcare payment mechanisms is done through
budget allocation (which is currently done on a histor-
ical basis) and fee-for-service payment, and health ex-
penditure is mainly directed towards hospitals (which
accounted for nearly 30% of the total health expenditure
in 2013, against 20% for preventive services, 18% for
medical products, 15% for ambulatory services and 14%
for administration) [3, 31], which does not bode well for
the strategic purchasing of health services since primary
healthcare is by far more the most efficient and equitable
level of services to progress towards UHC [1]. Things
are not going to improve at this level, since among the
budget priorities of the Beninese government for 2019,
was the planned construction of five new district hospi-
tals [32].
Among the numerous possible strategic purchasing in-
struments that may guide the ambitious reforms imple-
mented in Benin, the choice of the service package
covered by the ARCH insurance scheme is particularly
relevant and timely. Ideally, such a package should be
chosen so as to respond to the population’s health needs
and preferences. For a number of reasons (e.g. the influ-
ence of physicians, whose main professional orientation
is curative practice, on policy decisions; personal felt
needs for specialised clinical care by the elite decision
makers), nascent health insurance systems are often ori-
ented toward curative clinical services [33]. This is also
the case in Benin. Despite two actuarial studies having
been performed to guide the choice of the ARCH benefit
package, the final choice, operated during the first quar-
ter of 2019, resulted from negotiations within the gov-
ernment, and was principally driven by budget
constraints. Indeed, while one actuarial study recom-
mended opting for a benefit package corresponding to
an insurance premium amounting to about 30 USD per
person per annum [34], the chosen package’s estimated
cost is only slightly about ten USD per person per
annum. The essential benefit package comprises only
curative services relative to various disorders (diarrheal
diseases, malaria, respiratory infections and other infec-
tions in under-five children, dermatological conditions
and ear, nose and throat conditions in under-five chil-
dren, pregnancy and childbirth services, surgical emer-
gencies and trauma) provided along the three levels of
the health systems pyramid. This is fine as long as there
is no “crowding out” effect between the government’s
subsidies to the demand for curative services at the ex-
pense of the supply-side financing of the health system,
and of services that do not rely on user fees. Indeed, it is
important that the government continues financing cap-
ital investment, preventive and promotional health ser-
vices, as well as intersectoral action targeted on the
social determinants of health, which are necessary in
terms of public health, efficiency and financial sustain-
ability [35–37]. Benin should be inspired by the experi-
ence of Ghana, for instance, where the development of
the National Health Insurance Scheme – largely fi-
nanced by earmarked and other public funding – has
been accompanied by a reduction in the investment and
operational budgets of the Ministry of Health and the
Ghana Health Service. This has led in turn to a worrying
reduction in operating budgets, including those for the
financing of important preventive activities such as im-
munisation [38]. It has been gauged that because the
National Health Insurance Scheme does not explicitly
cover preventive services (e.g. check-ups, family plan-
ning, malaria prevention), but covers later stages of
health issues, it provides weak incentives for cost-
effectiveness and drives up claims expenditures [39].
Operational efficiency
A third level of desired public sector outcomes expected
from the public expenditure management system deals
with the efficiency and effectiveness of programmes and
service delivery resulting from the resource management
function [10]. The links between public expenditure
management and the health sector are multiple. It is
generally admitted that a good public expenditure man-
agement system positively impacts on the financing
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function of the health system and its outcomes, even if
evidence is scarce and mitigated [40–42]. The latest
Public Expenditure and Financing Accountability evalu-
ation of Benin, dating back to 2014, identifies a number
of problems in relation to public expenditure manage-
ment. It concludes that the efficient provision of services
is affected by the insufficiencies noted in the procure-
ment system, and that the common resort to exceptional
expenditure procedures does not allow the government
to determine the real cost of public services [43]. Since
then, the public expenditure management system has
been improved in a number of respects [18], but the
execution rate of the Ministry of Health’s budget re-
mains low (76.46% on a commitment basis in 2016, but
only 44.12% for capital expenditure) [44].
Specifically, health facilities receive financial resources
from four broad sources: the State budget (operating
budget, public investment programme, and specific pro-
grammes), parastatal and private pooled funds (e.g. pen-
sion funds, private insurance, community-based
insurance), donors and non-governmental organisations,
and households through user fees [3]. The efficiency of
the expenditure process is probably reduced due to the
multiplicity of pooled funds utilised to finance health
programmes: a study realised in 2014 identified no fewer
than 19 health financing schemes, including five fee ex-
emptions schemes [45]. These mechanisms, which repre-
sent 25 to 30% of public health expenditures, use many
financing channels; they are not always underpinned by
legal provisions; and the purchasing bodies are some-
times also different [3]. The multiplicity of financing
channels not only reduces operational efficiency, but also
very likely decreases the overall cost-effectiveness of
health expenditure, since no comprehensive analysis of
the opportunity and effectiveness of expenditure can be
made across all the existing budgets. Moreover, one im-
portant lesson associated with the unsuccessful experi-
ence of performance-based financing in Benin deals with
the lack of financial and managerial autonomy on the
part of health facilities and even health districts, which
prevents health managers taking the appropriate deci-
sions on the right mix of inputs they need to produce re-
sults [46].
The ARCH policy aims in the long term to partially
unify, or at least make existing financing mechanisms
more rational (especially fee exemptions), but it is
known from the literature that it is politically difficult to
integrate schemes once they are institutionalised because
integration involves the redistribution of resources
across organised interest groups [47]. Moreover, two
other dangers are currently looming and may jeopardise
the financial sustainability of health facilities, and hence
the operational efficiency and effectiveness of pro-
grammes and service delivery: first, the nascent ARCH
insurance scheme might encounter teething troubles just
as its sister scheme in Ghana did, resulting in the growth
in claims expenditures outpacing the growth of insur-
ance revenue, causing a sizable deficit soon transferred
to health facilities through long reimbursement delays
[39]; second, the Ministry of Finance is considering obli-
ging health facilities to transfer revenues from user fees
to a common Treasury account, which would obviously
choke health facilities financially, depriving them of the
necessary resources to cover daily expenses.
Discussion
Experience from past reforms promoted by international
financial institutions shows that “[t] he pursuit of aggre-
gate fiscal discipline is often done in such a way as to
undermine the performance” relative to the two other
objectives of a public expenditure management system –
“arbitrarily reordering priorities and devastating service
delivery and operational performance more generally”
[10]. Nowadays, fortunately, the international commu-
nity is particularly committed to finding “… more money
for health, and more health for the money” [48], thus
placing emphasis on the allocative and operational effi-
ciency of health expenditure.
Just like many UHC reforms in other countries, the
ARCH reform in Benin generates important challenges
that go beyond technical issues, and require tricky polit-
ical choices. The choice made by the government with
regard to covering the poor with the use of a specific
scheme, intends to reduce inequities in access to health
services, but entails a number of risks: pooling risks at
too low a level, thus reducing the potential of cross-
subsidisation by the richer and healthier populations;
maintaining a highly fragmented system, which gener-
ates inefficiencies and is difficult to circumvent at a later
date [49–51]; developing a two-tier system – especially if
budget constraints reinforced by an inefficient ARCH
funding system prevent the government from financing
a decent service package for the poor; and engendering
galloping health costs and reducing the cost-
effectiveness of the whole system. Such trade-offs should
be assessed and discussed through sufficiently inclusive
deliberative processes, in order to ensure sufficient con-
sideration for increased access for all categories of popu-
lation according to needs, and ownership of reforms by
stakeholders [52]. However, our interviews indicate that,
whereas the reform of the governance of the supply side
of the health system was grounded on a wide consult-
ation process, the model for financing and operationalis-
ing the ARCH health insurance project was elaborated
by a very limited number of technocrats, without ad-
equate social consultation, whereas donors and non-
governmental stakeholders are keen to be involved in
policy dialogue. Our inability to get official data on the
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financing of the off-budget pilot project also testimonies
of the opacity of the ARCH management to date, which
is deplored by many of our interlocutors. Combined
with the failure of the previous government’s attempt to
install such a scheme [8], this results in limited owner-
ship and lack of trust in the project by the health sector
stakeholders and the general population.
Conclusion
Benin faces important budgeting challenges with regard
to implementing its UHC policy, similar to those also
faced by many other African countries. We have
highlighted several of them – especially the need to find
sufficient, efficient, stable and sustainable resources to fi-
nance the social insurance aspect; the need to make sure
that the resources dedicated by the government to the
social health insurance system are not compensated for
by a reduction in capital investments in the sector and/
or a reduction in the financing of preventive and promo-
tional primary healthcare services; and the need to im-
prove the efficiency of public expenditure and the
financial autonomy of health facilities. In addition, im-
plementation issues further jeopardise the ambitious
ARCH project, and will have to be closely monitored so
as to facilitate its expansion. As for the scale-up phase of
the ARCH scheme, it will be essential to guarantee the
overall coherence of the ARCH funding system and to
clearly articulate the possible funds from the different
sources of financing. Ideally, a common pool should be
set up to guarantee cross-subsidies between the different
categories of population. The defragmentation of exist-
ing schemes is necessary, but will most certainly be pol-
itically difficult to implement. At this level too,
transparency and negotiation are needed to ensure the
political feasibility of the reform.
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